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COMMENTS
THE THEORY OF THE CASE
The doctrine of the theory of the case seems to have been one
of peculiar vitality, for although it has been often repudiated,
it has been often resurrected. Its latest appearance is in the
case of Nesbitt v. Miller,' where the court says this: "That one
must recover upon the theory of his complaint, or, not at all, is
too well settled to require the citation of authorities."
The doctrine of the theory of the case includes three rather
distinct situations. (1) The one most frequently arising is the
one in the principal case, where it is a statement to the effect
that a verdict, finding or judgment must be supported by, or
conform to the formal pleadings in the case, without regard to
the merits of the case as disclosed by the evidence. In this form
it is a continuation of the common law rule on the subject. The
Legislature has attempted in no uncertain terms to repudiate it.
Sec. 426 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 19262 requires the courts to dis-
regard "in every stage of the action, any error or defect in the
pleadings or proceedings which does not affect the substantial
rights of the adverse party." Sec. 725 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat.
19263 prohibits the reversal by the courts of appeal of any case
for a defect in the pleadings which might be amended by the
court below, and to decide every appeal on the merits.
The statutes have been accepted and applied in many cases,
even where the pleading was properly attacked in the first in-
stance.4 The most recent acceptance is in the case of Kostanzer
v. State.5 The problem is adequately discussed; the doctrine
1 - Ind. App. -, 188 N. E. 702 (1934).
2 Sec. 2-1071 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1933.
3 Sec. 2-3231 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1933.
4 Sec. 368 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926 (Sec. 2-1013 Burns Ann. Ind.
Stat. 1933) provides that if a demurrer is overruled erroneously the case
shall still be decided on the merits.
5 - Ind. App. - , 187 N. E. 337 (1933).
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repudiated and the authorities collected in the case of Cleveland,
C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Gillespie.6
In two very recent cases t1e Appellate Court itself has in effect
repudiated it. For in the case of School City of Crawfordsville
v. Montgomery 7 it determined that a demurrer to the complaint
should have been sustained and reversed the case because this
decision made "it unnecessary to consider other questions pre-
sented by this appeal." On rehearing s however, the court struck
out that statement in its opinion and passed upon the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the trial court's decision. And in the
case of Hosanna v. Odishoo9 it sustained a judgment for a party
who had filed no pleading asking for it. The court laid some
emphasis upon the fact that the action was equitable. This is
immaterial. The code applies equally to actions at law and in
equity.
There is thus ample authority contrary to the court's state-
ment in the principal case. In the interest of consistency it
would seem desirable, however, for the courts to either finally
repudiate the statutes on the subject or the cases which go back
to the common law rule.
(2) The doctrine of the theory of the case has also been used
to compel a plaintiff to elect between two inconsistent allega-
tions in one paragraph of complaint when the case is submitted
to the jury.10 In view of the fact that had the plaintiff made his
inconsistent allegations in separate paragraphs of his complaint
he could not be required to so elect this result seems itself incon-
sistent. Certainly it is at variance with the statutes referred to
above, for the plaintiff has done nothing more than to violate a
rule of pleading requiring inconsistent allegations to be made in
separate paragraphs of complaint. The defect is thus procedural
and clearly should be held to be cured by the statutes.]' (The
6- Ind. App. - , 173 N. E. 708 (1930). See note on this case in
6 Ind. L. J. 402; cf. Southern Ind. G. & E. Co. v. Winstead, 92 Ind. App.
329, 175 N. E. 281 (1931) where within a year the same court returned to
the doctrine. See note on this case in 6 Ind. L. J. 575.
7- Ind. App. -, 187 N. E. 57 (1933).
8 - Ind. App.-, 188 N. E. 695 (1934).
9 - Ind. App. - 187 N. E. 897 (1933).
10 See, e. g., Union City v. Murphy, 176 Ind. 597, 96 N. E. 584 (1911).
11 See Nordyke & Marmon Co. v. Hilborg, 62 Ind. App. 196, 110 N. E.
684 (1916) where the complaint was in one paragraph and the court prop-
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case of Union City v. Murphy12 was decided in 1911, prior to
many significant changes in our Code on the subject, so that it,
along with practically all of our cases prior to 1911 are of no
authority in the proper decision of a case under our present
statutes.)
(3) The doctrine of the theory of the case is applied where a
case calls for a choice between a legal action or an equitable suit
and the constitutional right to a jury trial is involved.' 3 If a
plaintiff starts what is construed to be an equitable suit to allow
him to recover on a legal action would deprive the adverse party
of a jury trial. There seems to be no escape from the doctrine in
such a case. Although, of course, the failure to establish the
equitable claim must be such as to indicate bad faith, for equity
has jurisdiction to render a common law judgment in cases
where the failure to establish the equitable claim indicates good
faith and reasonable grounds for equitable relief in the first
instance.14
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erly took the position that the defect was waived by the failure to properly
attack it during the pleading stage of the trial.
12 Supra Note 10.
13 See, e. g., Elliott v. Pontius, 136 Ind. 641, 36 N. E. 421 (1894); Boon-
ville Natl. Bank v. Blakely, 166 Ind. 427, 76 N. E. 529 (1906).
14 See, e. g., Doherty v. Holliday, 137 Ind. 282, 32 N. E. 315 (1893).
See also Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.), Sees. 236-242.
